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Summary
Cyber security is an important concern for all individuals, organisations and gov-
ernments globally. Cyber attacks have become more sophisticated, frequent and dan-
gerous than ever, and traditional anomaly detection methods have been proven to be
less effective when dealing with these new classes of cyber threats. In order to ad-
dress this, both classical and Bayesian statistical models offer a valid and innovative
alternative to the traditional signature-based methods, motivating the increasing in-
terest in statistical research that it has been observed in recent years. In this review we
provide a description of some typical cyber security challenges, typical types of data
and statistical methods, paying special attention to Bayesian approaches for these
problems.
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1 Introduction
Cyber security can be broadly defined as the set of tasks and procedures required to defend
computers and individuals from malicious attacks. Its origin can be traced back to 1971, a pe-
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riod where the Internet as we know it today was not even born. Amongst the computer science
community it is widely accepted that it all started with Bob Thomas and his harmless experi-
mental computer program known as the Creeper. This program was designed to move through
the ARPANET1 leaving the following message: ”I’m the creeper: catch me if you can”. Inspired
by Bob Thomas’ Creeper, Roy Tomlinson created an enhanced version, allowing the Creeper
to self-replicate, therefore coding the first computer worm. Later on, he would also design the
Reaper which can be considered the first antivirus system, since it was designed to move across
the ARPANET and delete the Creeper.
Despite a harmless origin, some years later the world would find out that network breaches
and malicious activity were more dangerous than expected and cyber threats became a serious
matter. Nowadays, cyber security is considered a major concern that affects people, organisa-
tions and governments equally, due not only to the growth of computer networks and Inter-
net usage but also to the fact that cyber attacks are more sophisticated and frequent than ever.
These cyber attacks represent a complex new challenge that demands more innovative solutions,
hence, it requires a multi-disciplinary effort in order to be well-prepared and protected against
such threats. Some of the disciplines involved in this task include computer science, computer
and network architecture and statistics (Adams and Heard, 2014).
In this review we are mainly interested in the statistical approaches to cyber security prob-
lems and we centre our attention on how the discovery of cyber threats has been tackled as an
anomaly detection problem. In particular, we discuss three different classes of anomaly detection
problems within cyber security research and the typical types of data used in each one of them.
The first of these problems is about volume-traffic anomaly detection, the second one about net-
work anomaly detection and, finally, the third one is about malware detection and classification.
For each of these problems we gently describe and discuss some of the most common Bayesian
models that have been used to address them. For other approaches to anomaly detection and cy-
ber security, such as classical statistics, machine learning and data mining approaches the reader
could direct their attention to recent reviews by Buczak and Guven (2016), Chandola et al. (2009),
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Gupta et al. (2014) and Adams and Heard (2014).
Traditionally, cyber security threat detection systems have been built around signature-based
methods; in this approach, large data sets of signatures of known malicious threats are devel-
oped and the network is constantly monitored to find appearances of such signatures. These
systems have been proved effective for known threats but can be slow or ineffective when deal-
ing with new ones. An example of this is the blacklisting approach used by commercial an-
tivirus softwares, where if a signature is found the program is disabled; however, new malicious
code can be made with slight changes to the original in order to avoid recognition (McGraw
and Morrisett, 2000). Detecting new malicious code or mutations of known ones, and dealing
with time-evolving threats, are some of the reasons why we need to consider alternatives to
signature-based methods. In order to do so, statistics offers a wide range of options for cyber
security problems; these include both classical and Bayesian approaches that, in general, can be
built on either parametric or nonparametric assumptions. Statistical anomaly detection methods
usually build a model of normal behaviour to be considered as a benchmark, so that departures
from this behaviour might be an indication that an anomaly has occurred.
Cyber security research from a mathematical and statistical point of view has proved to be
an interesting and complex challenge that has led to an increasing interest in recent years. There
are various reviews and reports (e.g. Willinger and Paxson (1998), Catlett (2008), Meza et al.
(2009), Dunlavy et al. (2009)) that outline some of the key areas, problems and challenges the
mathematical community faces. It was early remarked (Willinger and Paxson, 1998) how the
constant changes in time and sites made the Internet such a difficult object to understand. Since
then all authors have agreed that ,due to the continuously exponential growth of the Internet
and computer networks, there is a need for statistical models able to scale well to high-volume
data sets of real time heteroscedastic and non-stationary data. Moreover, as pointed out by
Catlett (2008), the mathematical models used should be able to distinguish between harmless
anomalies and malicious threats. In other words, the procedures should detect anomalies with
high-accuracy and low false positive rates, which represent a significant computational challenge
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with usually available data.
The need to design on-line detection methods able to handle high-volumes of data is not the
only challenge discussed in these reviews. For example, Catlett (2008) also discussed the role
mathematics play, by allowing us to understand computer networks, the Internet and malware
behaviour in providing predictive awareness for secure systems. On a separate note, the author
also remarked the need to advance the state of the art in graph theory and large-scale simulation
to understand the spreading process of malicious code. Meza et al. (2009) further emphasised
the importance of having access to reliable data. All of the challenges just described can be
well-grouped into three general research areas, as discussed in Dunlavy et al. (2009), which are:
modelling large-scale networks, discovering cyber threats, and network dynamics and cyber
attacks, which we describe in the following.
The first research area deals with the modelling of large-scale networks like the modern In-
ternet or any current computer network. Their mathematical representation (just as with any
other network) is through a graph theory formulation (Newman, 2010) and, historically, the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi formulation of random graphs provided a mathematical model that could handle
small-scale networks like the infant Internet (Chen et al., 2015). However, nowadays computer
networks are examples of large-scale dynamic networks, so they have a large amount of nodes
and edges (representing the computers/users and the connections amongst them) that are con-
stantly evolving and changing over time and that are not completely random. Hence, there is
a need to develop more sophisticated network mathematical formulations and new statistical
techniques for comparing them. The reader could refer to Olding and Wolfe (2014) for a review
on classical graph theory methods applied to modern network data.
Discovering cyber threats is the second research area that we consider when dealing with
cyber security problems. As said before, cyber attacks are more sophisticated and frequent than
ever, hence, the need for models capable of detecting malicious code and their variations, com-
plicated multi-stage attacks and, if possible, the source of such malicious code (Dunlavy et al.,
2009). Moreover, the detection methods should ideally be designed for on-line detection and able
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to handle time-evolving data as well. This is the area we explore in more depth in this review
paper.
Finally, and due to the fact that almost all cyber attacks work by spreading malicious code
through a vast number of the computer network’s nodes, the last of the mathematical challenges
found in cyber security is related to network dynamics and cyber attacks. This area is mainly
dedicated to understanding the spreading characteristics of malicious code through a computer
network, before and after it has been detected and protections against the malicious code have
been released. Some of the particular problems consist in determining the potential limit of the
infection and the interplay of the malicious spreading and the protection processes. More details
and issues can be found in Dunlavy et al. (2009).
From the brief description given of the three main research areas, it can be easily argued
that one of the key objectives of cyber security is to be well-prepared with good explanatory
and predictive models. In order to do so, there is a need for real-world data that preserves its
integrity over time (Meza et al., 2009). Fortunately, there are some publicly available data sets
that can be used for research purposes like Microsoft’s malware data set (Ronen et al., 2018), Los
Alamos National Laboratory’s data sets (Hagberg et al., 2014; Kent, 2015; Turcotte et al., 2018)
and Palo Alto Networks and Shodan data sets (Amit et al., 2018).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Sections 2, 3 and 4 we describe and
explore respectively volume-traffic anomaly detection, network anomaly detection and malware
detection and classification. In each of these sections we provide a gentle description of the kind
of data used and how Bayesian models have been used to address these problems and whenever
necessary, we provide an insight into the classical formulation of the problem at hand and how
they compare to their Bayesian counterparts. In Section 5 we provide an insight into alternative
cyber threat anomaly detection procedures. Lastly, Section 6 presents final points of discussion.
5
2 Volume-traffic anomaly detection
To begin developing statistical methods for computer network data, it is useful to have a high-
level description of a computer network. The Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) is a widely-
used conceptual set of rules for computer systems to be able to communicate with one another.
The communication process is achieved through the joint work of seven sequentially connected
layers, each one with its own purpose. These layers are: the physical layer, the data link layer, the
network layer, the transport layer, the session layer, the presentation layer and the application
layer. For a thorough understanding the reader can refer to Myhre (2001) and Hall (2000).
These layers work in conjunction with one another to ensure correct and reliable transmis-
sion of information. As such, malicious activity could be targeted to any of the layers in order
to destabilise the communication process between computer systems. For the purposes of this
section we shall restrict our attention to the third layer of the OSI-model: the network layer. This
layer is in charge of structuring and managing a multi-edge network including addressing, rout-
ing and traffic control (Hall, 2000). The data is transmitted by breaking it down into pieces called
packets. These packets consist of the control information and the user data, the latter commonly
known as the payload. The control information provides data for delivering the payload: e.g.,
source and destination network addresses, error detection codes and segment information.
The packet rate which is defined as the number of packets per time unit moving across the
network is one of the most common volume-traffic characteristics used for analysing a network’s
traffic. Their constant surveillance is useful for the detection of certain cyber threats that create
changes in the network’s normal traffic behaviour, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks which are intended to saturate the victim’s network with traffic.
Volume-traffic data sets can be obtained upon request from Los Angeles Network Data Ex-
change and Repository (LANDER) project. For example, Polunchenko et al. (2012) analysed the
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) reflector attack using the packet rate by modelling
the normal traffic behaviour and the traffic during the attack. The model they presented is a
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N(µ, aµ)−to−N(θ, aθ) change-point model, where the first Gaussian component describes the
normal packet rate’s behaviour and the second one the rate’s behaviour during the attack. Al-
though the volume data is a time series of counts, Polunchenko et al. (2012) found that the Gaus-
sian assumption was more realistic than the Poisson process models used in other approaches to
traffic data (see, for example: Cao et al. (2003) and Karagiannis et al. (2004)). The point estimates
of the normal traffic mean and variance were 13329.76 and 266972.73 for a variance-mean ratio
of 20.02, whereas during the attack they changed to 17723.83 and 407968.14 for a variance-mean
ratio of 23.02. A reproduction of the normal packet rate and the rate during an attack (occurring
at time 101 and lasting 240 units of time) is shown in Figure 1. The reader should realise that any
good change-point detection procedure should be able to detect such a clear change.
Figure 1: Packet rate simulation from a N(13329.76, 266972.73)-to-
N(17723.83, 407968.14).
A particularly useful characteristic of the N(µ, aµ)−to−N(θ, aθ) change-point model is al-
lowing a ∈ R+ to be an extra parameter which yields a more flexible and robust model able to
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capture changes in mean and the effect these changes have on the variance, even if there is not
such a clear change in the traffic’s behaviours. An example of this can be appreciated from a sim-
ulation with parameters µ = 13329.764, θ = 13600 and a = 20.028 (Figure 2), where the attack
occurs at the same times as in the previous simulation but it does not produce a clear change in
the trace.
Figure 2: Packet rate simulation from a N(µ, aµ)−to−N(θ, aθ) with µ = 13329.764, θ =
13600 and a = 20.028.
Another free network flow data set is described in Kent (2015). The downloadable file
”flows.txt.gz” presents network flow events from 58 consecutive days within Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory’s corporate internal computer network; each event is characterised by 9 vari-
ables: time, duration, source computer, source port, destination computer, destination port, pro-
tocol, packet count and byte count. The first three events included in the file are reported, as an
illustration, in Table 1.
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time duration source comp. source port dest. comp dest. port prot. packet count byte
1 0 C1065 389 C3799 N10451 6 10 5323
1 0 C1423 N1136 C1707 N1 6 5 847
1 0 C1423 N1142 C1707 N1 6 5 847
Table 1: Extract form the network flow events (Los Alamos National Library).
In this data set we can identify two different kind of variables. It is clear that we have
access to volume-traffic characteristics such as the packet or byte count which can be used for
volume-traffic anomaly detection purposes. The second set of variables characterise each event
by providing the source and destination computer, the ports and the protocol used which allow
us to perform a more refined analysis. This data can be used if we are trying to detect a rogue
user or if there is a particularly sensitive and important computer that should not be involved
in more than a certain amount of events or should not be the destination node for a certain kind
of source computers. The above piece of information also allow us to develop multi-channel
detectors by splitting the network traffic characteristics into separate bins represented by the
source or destination. Moreover, a dynamic analysis of the network can be performed by taking
into account the time at which each event took place.
2.1 Bayesian approaches to volume-traffic anomaly detection
Volume-traffic anomaly detection is concerned with detecting cyber attacks that produce changes
in traffic measures such as packet rate. The main goal is to detect as fast as possible changes
in the normal behaviour. Once a change has been detected an alarm needs to be sent off so
that the system can be checked and then decide whether there has been an attack or not (false
alarm). It is important to remark that false alarms could yield important interruptions in the
computer network, so there is a need to find the true change by seeking a low false positive rate
as well. This yields a tradeoff between the detection delay and the false alarm rate that we need
to consider for the detection procedure. The methods used to analyse these kind of data sets are
mainly based on the statistical theory of change-point analysis.
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2.1.1 Change-point analysis
The main objective of change-point analysis is the accurate detection of changes in a process or
system that occur at unknown moments in time. In a single change-point setting we assume that
there is a sequence of random variables {Xn}n≥1 (not necessarily independent nor identically
distributed (iid)) such that
Xn ∼ f(Xn|X(n−1)),
where X(n−1) = (X1, ..., Xn−1) and the common probability density function (pdf) f is known
as the pre-change density. Then, at an unknown time ν, something unusual occurs and from the
time ν + 1 onwards
Xn ∼ g(Xn|X(n−1)).
In this setting ν is known as the change-point and the pdf g 6= f is called the post-change density.
It is important to remark that theoretically, the densities f and g might depend on n and ν as well,
that is,
f(Xn|X(n−1)) = fn(Xn|X(n−1)) and g(Xn|X(n−1)) = gn,ν(Xn|X(n−1)).
Allowing these densities to depend on n and ν might help us to more realistically explain
time-evolving data found whilst doing cyber security research. In practice the post-change dis-
tribution gn,ν(·) might only be known up to some unknown parameter or vector of parameters
θ. Therefore, in some applications the problem can be reduced to detecting changes in mean,
changes in variance or changes in both.
In order to deal with change-point detection problems, one could either follow a non-
sequential approach where the objective is to detect the changes in a fixed set of observations,
or a sequential approach where the goal is to detect changes as new data arrives. Since both
of these approaches have been tackled from a classical and a Bayesian perspective, the choice
will certainly depend on the type of problem at hand and the objective of the analysis. From a
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cyber security point of view there is a need for constant surveillance of the computer network,
therefore it is important to have fast on-line detection procedures. That is why in this review we
only explore the sequential approach to change-point detection and how it has been applied to
volume-traffic anomaly detection problems. In the following section we provide an insight into
the sequential change-point analysis theory and objectives. For a complete review on the matter
the reader could refer to Polunchenko and Tartakovsky (2011).
2.1.2 Sequential change-point analysis
The objective of a sequential change-point analysis is to decide after each new observation
whether the observations’ common probability density function is currently f or not. One of
the main challenges is that the change should be detected with as few observations as possible
past the true change-point, which must be balanced against the risk of false alarms. In order
to address this, we must reach a tradeoff between the loss associated with the detection delay
and the loss associated with false alarms (Polunchenko et al., 2012). A good sequential detection
procedure must minimise the average detection delay (ADD) subject to a constraint on the false
alarm rate (FAR).
There have been several approaches to analyse the tradeoff between early detection and
number of false alarms. For the purposes of the review we focus our attention on the mini-
max formulation first defined by Lorden (1971), where ν is unknown (but not random) and the
Bayesian formulation, where ν is considered a random variable with an appropriate prior dis-
tribution assigned. From a statistical perspective we are going to be testing at each step the
following hypothesis:
Hk : ν = k ≥ 0 vs H∞ : ν =∞.
Once a detection statistic, based on the likelihood ratio given by
Λkn =
p(X(n)|Hk)
p(X(n)|H∞)
,
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has been chosen we supply it to an appropriate sequential detection procedure i.e., a stopping
time T with respect to the natural filtration Fn = σ(X(n)). For example, in the minimax setting
the cumulative sum control chart (or simply CUSUM) procedure (Page, 1954) is widely used,
whereas in the Bayesian approach the most commonly used one is the Shiryaev-Roberts (SR)
procedure (due to the independent work of Shiryaev (1961, 1963) and Roberts (1966)). Once
a realisation of the detection procedure takes place at, say, time T , we have a false alarm if
T ≤ ν otherwise, the detection delay is given by the random variable T − ν, which is commonly
measured through the average detection delay given by
ADD(T ) = E(T − ν|T > ν).
A Bayesian optimal detection procedure will be the one that minimises the ADD subject to the
probability of false alarm, P(T ≤ ν), does not exceed a fixed threshold α ∈ (0, 1). It is important
to remark that in both the minimax and Bayesian formulation the detection procedure is only
applied once, hence, what happens after the alarm is not important. This certainly represents
an issue for surveillance applications, such as cyber security, where there is a need to repeatedly
apply the detection procedure. After each false alarm or an actual attack we need to start moni-
toring the system again, hence a specification of a renewal mechanism is required. For example,
assuming an homogeneous process, we could start from scratch after every alarm, yielding a
multi-cyclic model (Tartakovsky, 2014). In this scenario it is very likely that if an attack actually
occurs it will happen a long time after the surveillance began, situation that has led to inter-
esting theoretical results. For example, Pollak and Tartakovsky (2009) proved that under some
assumptions the multi-cyclic Shiryaev-Roberts detection procedure is optimal with respect to the
stationary average delay to detection (SADD) which can be thought as the limiting case of the
ADD. For a more comprehensive and exhaustive review on the minimax approach, the Bayesian
formulation and the multi-cyclic approach the reader could refer to Tartakovsky (2014).
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In network security, change-point detection theory provides a natural framework for
volume-traffic anomaly detection. Still, there are some important considerations we need to
contemplate. Tartakovsky (2014) argues that the behaviour of both pre- and post-attack traffic is
poorly understood, as result, neither the pre- nor post-change distributions are known. There-
fore, it is suggested that we can not rely on the likelihood ratio at all and we might think of using
score-based statistics instead. The statistics proposed are suitable modifications of the CUSUM
and SR statistics that include a score sensitive function. The way in which this score function is
selected will depend on the type of change one is trying to detect. For example, for a change in
mean, Tartakovsky et al. (2006a,b) proposed a linear memoryless score function.
Another important observation due to Tartakovsky et al. (2006a,b) is that, in certain condi-
tions, splitting packets in bins and considering multichannel detectors helps localise and detect
attacks more quickly. This multichannel setting can be thought as a generalisation of the classical
change-point detection problem, where we assume that an n-dimensional stochastic process is
going to be observed simultaneously and at a random time only one of the entries will change
its behaviour. This setting might be useful when dealing for example with DoS attacks where it
has been observed that an increase number of packets of certain size occurs during the attack.
3 Network anomaly detection
Monitoring volume-traffic data is one important method of cyber security anomaly detection.
However, there are other variables we can consider for network analysis. For example, monitor-
ing the features that characterise each packet such as the version, the header length, the priority,
the length of the packet or characteristics of the connections between computers such as the
source and destination computer or protocol can be used and need different anomaly detection
methods. Most of the procedure used will require a graph theory formulation and classification
models.
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As established before, statistical anomaly detection models usually build a model of nor-
mal behaviour that works as a benchmark. Therefore, network anomaly detection models also
allow us to analyse the normal behaviour of a computer network. In particular, studying the
connections between the components of a computer network from a graph theory perspective
has proven to be helpful for threats such as compromised credentials, intrusion detections and
distributed denial of service attacks. In research some of the most commonly used data sets for
modelling computer network behaviour belong to Los Alamos National Library (Hagberg et al.
(2014), Kent (2015) and Turcotte et al. (2018)). These data sets are mainly comprised of network
and computer events collected from Los Alamos National Laboratory enterprise network. For
example, the User-Authentication Associations in Time data set (Hagberg et al., 2014) encom-
passes 9 months of successful event authentications for a total of 708,304,516 connections. As an
illustration, the first seven events are shown in Table 2.
time user computer
1 U1 C1
1 U1 C2
2 U2 C3
3 U3 C4
6 U4 C5
7 U4 C5
Table 2: User-computer authentications associations in time.
This kind of data sets allow us to view the computer network as a bipartite graph with
users and computers as nodes and the connections as edges. Some of the key tasks for anomaly
detection consist in creating a set of normal pattern connections amongst users and computers
and grouping together similar users.
3.1 Bayesian approaches to network anomaly detection
We now turn our attention to network anomaly detection in the Bayesian framework. The basic
idea is that we can characterise normal pattern connections within a computer network, either by
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the constant surveillance of packet features or the pattern connections between the nodes of the
computer network (e.g., users and computers). The detection of anomalous activity occurs when
a connection can not be grouped with normal behaviour clusters. In the following subsections
we explore some of the Bayesian approaches that have been used to create these clusters for
anomaly detection.
3.1.1 Bayesian clustering
The task of creating groups of normal behaviour can be achieved by cluster analysis. Distance-
based algorithms are some of the most common ways to create such clusters; however, each
one of these algorithms require the specification of what similarity between groups looks like
through the choice of a distance measure (e.g., Euclidean distance or Manhattan distance). This
implies that the clustering process will rely on both the algorithm and the distance (or similarity
measure) choice. Besides using distances between data points, clustering can be performed by
considering how dense parts of the data space are. In other words, clusters represent areas
densely populated by data points, separated by regions of low density. The most popular of
these methods is the DBScan algorithm (Ester et al., 1996).
Bayesian clustering models have also been used for cyber security research. In particular,
Metelli and Heard (2016) used a 2-step procedure for inferring cluster configurations of users
with similar connection patterns and at the same time modelling new connections across the
network. The first step uses a Bayesian agglomerative clustering algorithm with the choice of the
multiplicative change in the posterior probability as a similarity measure. This algorithm yields
an initial cluster configuration of users with similar connection behaviours, which is then used
in a Bayesian Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) with time-dependent covariates for
the identification of new edges within the computer network. In this case, the chosen covariates
for a connection between the i-th user and the j-th computer are the overall unique number of
authentications over time for the computer and the restriction of these authentications to the
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user’s cluster. This 2-step procedure requires a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm
for the joint update of the initial clusters and the coefficient parameters.
Working along this line, Metelli and Heard (2019) presented a Bayesian model for new edge
prediction and anomaly detection using a Bayesian Cox regression model like the one previously
introduced in Metelli and Heard (2016). However, in the most recent approach the authors used
a more robust set of covariates. These covariates can be grouped into two different classes: the
first group is comprised of the unique number of authentication over time for each client (i.e.
time-varying out-degree), the unique number of authentication over time to each computer (i.e.
time-varying in-degree) and two indicator functions respectively specifying if the last connec-
tion and the last two connections made by the client were new. The second set of covariates
represent what the authors described as the notion of attraction between clients and servers. For
their construction both hard-threshold and soft-threshold clustering models were used in a la-
tent feature space. Finally, it is also important to remark that the initial cluster configuration was
obtained through the spectral biclustering algorithm by Dhillon (2001), rather than the Bayesian
agglomerative clustering approach.
3.1.2 Topic modelling and LDA
Topic models are probabilistic models that have their origins in latent semantic indexing (LSI)
modelling (Deerwester et al., 1990). LSI uses the singular value decomposition of a
term-document association matrix in order to create a space where related terms and documents
are placed near one another. Hofmann (2001), using this idea, developed the probabilistic latent
semantic analysis (PLSA) which can be considered the first topic model. His approach uses a
generative latent class model to perform a probabilistic mixture decomposition. Other models,
such as the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model (Blei et al., 2003), have also been introduced
with the task of discovering the topics that occur in a set of documents. However, they have
been widely used in other fields where there is a need of unsupervised clustering.
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The topics produced by these models are clusters of similar words which allow examining a
set of documents (also known as a corpus) and discovering the topic (or topics) covered. As dis-
cussed in Blei et al. (2003) two of the usual assumptions made are that the words in a document
are exchangeable (also known as the “bag-of-words” assumption) and so are the documents.
These assumptions allows us to exploit de Finetti’s representation theorem2 for exchangeable
random variables.
In the LDA model, the basic idea is that every document in the corpus can be represented
as a random mixture over a known and fixed number k of latent topics, which are characterised
by a distribution over words. It is further assumed that the word probabilities are characterised
by an unknown but fixed matrix β of dimensions k ×M that needs to be estimated, where M
is the size of the vocabulary. In practice M is usually large, thereby creating issues related to
sparsity and with the prediction of new documents. In order to address this, Blei et al. (2003)
also described and developed a fuller Bayesian approach, usually called the smoothed LDA, by
allowing β to be random and a Dirichlet prior distribution assigned to each row βi.
The LDA model’s original setup includes a corpus X with N documents w1,...,wN , each one
having Pn words, w1,1, ..., wn,Pn taken from a dictionary of size M . The length of each document
can be sampled from a Poisson distribution or from a more realistic document-length distribu-
tion. For each of the words in the n-th document we first select a random topic zi from which a
random word will be assigned. The mathematical representation of the generative process is:
θn ∼ Dirichlet(α)
zi ∼Multinomial(θ) i ∈ {1, ..., Pn}
wi ∼Multinomial(βzi).
Given the parameter (or vector of parameters) α and the matrix β the joint distribution of a
topic mixture θ, a set of Pn topics z and a set of Pn words w is given by:
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p(θ, z,w|β, α) = p(θ|α)
Pn∏
k=1
p(zk|θ)p(wk|zk, β).
Integrating over θ and summing over z we obtain the marginal distribution of a document:
p(w|α, β) =
∫
p(θ|α)
(
Pn∏
k=1
∑
zk
p(zk|θ)p(wk|zk, β)
)
dθ,
and taking the product of single documents we obtain the probability of a corpus:
p(X|α, β) =
N∏
d=1
∫
p(θd|α)
Pnd∏
k=1
∑
zdk
p(zdk |θd)p(wdk |zdk , β)
 dθd.
Although the latent Dirichlet allocation model was first developed for document classifi-
cation problems, it has been shown to be a valid and useful technique for network anomaly
detection and for modelling computer network behaviour. The reader can refer to Heard et al.
(2016) for an example on how the LDA model can be used to analyse computer network connec-
tion traffic data to determine the number of users present. In their approach, each document is
represented by the day’s authentication records, different users are the topics and the destina-
tion computers play the role of the words. In this scenario each of the entries of θn indicates how
active was the respective user in the n-th day. As discussed by the authors this procedure could
play an important role for detecting misuse of credentials.
In matters of anomaly detection, Cao et al. (2016) considered applying the LDA model to
analyse features obtained from the packet headers captured using tcpdump3. In their approach,
the documents are represented by the tcpdump traffic obtained within a time slot and the words
are the unique packet’s network features. The LDA model is used on free attack traffic data in
order to learn its feature patterns and new traffic data is then compared against it. The authors
proposed using the likelihood of a new document as the detector of anomalous activity. A similar
procedure can be found in Cramer and Carin (2011), where the LDA model and the dynamic
LDA (dLDA) (Pruteanu-Malinici et al., 2010) are considered to analyse Ethernet packets. In
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their approach the data is also divided into fixed time intervals and the words are any event of
interest observed across 45 well-known ports used for network topic modelling. In their results
the dLDA proved to be a better choice for modelling this kind of data due to the dLDA’s ability
to analyse time-dependent documents by letting the weights over the topics to change in time.
3.1.3 Poisson factorisation
Topic models are not the only probabilistic models used for cyber security research that have
been originally designed for other purposes. Poisson factorisation models, which are widely
used for recommender systems in machine learning (see for example, Gopalan et al. (2013) and
Gopalan et al. (2014)), have also been used for network anomaly detection. Poisson factorisation
is a probabilistic model of users and items that was proposed as an alternative to the classical
probabilistic matrix factorisation (PMF) (Salakhutdinov and Mnih, 2007).
The main assumption is that the data can be represented in a matrix, in the recommender
system the rows are the clients and the columns the number of items. Each entry of this matrix
is assumed to be the rating given by a certain user to a particular item, and these are modelled
using the dot-product of latent factors for both the users and the items. Probabilistic matrix
factorisation assumes that each entry is normally distributed and Gaussian priors are assigned
on the latent factors for both the users and movies. This will theoretically imply that the ratings
could become negative which is something we would not desire to have. In order to address this
issue, Poisson factorisation assumes that both the users and the latent factors are non-negative
and so a Poisson distribution for the entries and gamma distributions for the latent factors are
used instead. These assumptions make Poisson factorisation more applicable to real data sets
like The Netflix Prize dataset (Bennett and Lanning, 2007), where we have a set of users and the
rankings for each movie in the catalogue.
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With respect to cyber security research, Turcotte et al. (2016a) considered Poisson factori-
sation models for peer-based user analysis which provides a better understanding of the indi-
viduals by learning their peer’s behaviour. The basic idea is that computer users with similar
roles within an organisation will have similar patterns of behaviour. This type of analysis can
be particularly important for quickly detecting rogue users. The behaviour of a new user can be
compared to their peers and anomalies detected. The data used is the recorded authentication
events (Table 2) as briefly explained in Section 2.
The model is further specified by letting Yui be the number of times that user u authenticates
on machine i and where it is assumed that
Yui ∼ Poisson(θuβi), with u = 1, . . . , U and i = 1, . . . , C,
where θu for u = 1, . . . , U and βi for i = 1, . . . , C are k-dimensional vectors of positive values.
The model is interpreted as having k latent features characterising the users (such as job title,
department, etc.) with θu representing their scores for the u-th user and k latent features charac-
terising each computer (such as the number of daily processes, the type of computer, etc.), with
βi representing their scores for the i-th computer.
A certain feature might have a high score for all machines within one department and low
scores otherwise. If a user had a high-score on that feature then they are likely to have many
authentication events on machines in that department (perhaps, representing that they work in
that department). If a user had a low-score on that feature then they are likely to have a very low
number of authentication events. In general, the mean number of authentication events for a
user on a machine is the sum over products of many features which allows similarities between
users and computers to be learnt from the data. The specification of the model is completed by
assuming that θu,j
i.i.d.∼ Ga(a, ζu), βu,j i.i.d.∼ Ga(b, ηi), ζu ∼ Ga(a′, b′) and ηi ∼ Ga(c′, d′). The model
is fitted to a training sample and anomalies can be detected by comparing predictions from this
model to observed values from a testing sample.
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3.1.4 Dirichlet process
So far, we have only described Bayesian models working under parametric assumptions. Al-
though these models have been proven effective in detecting network anomalies, there is still a
missing methodology that we need to consider: the non-parametric realm. Bayesian nonpara-
metrics has become widely popular in research areas such as finance, biology, machine learning,
recommender systems and computer science, amongst others. In contrast to parametric mod-
els, Bayesian nonparametrics models are becoming increasingly appealing mainly because they
posses a flexibility that can hardly be achieved by parametric models. This flexibility is explained
through the fact that these models in contrast to parametric ones, assume that the parameter
space is an infinite-dimensional object, something specially useful as more data becomes avail-
able. For cyber security research, where huge amounts of time evolving data are available almost
instantly, Bayesian nonparametrics models should provide a more suitable modelling techniques
and provide interesting insights and solutions to the problem at hand.
Historically, it is widely accepted that Bayesian nonparametrics had its beginnings with the
work of Ferguson (1973) and in recent years the research in this area has increased significantly.
In this paper we do not cover the motivation and basic ideas of Bayesian nonparametrics; how-
ever, the reader should refer to Hjort et al. (2010) for a thorough and comprehensive introduction
to Bayesian nonparametrics and to the state-of-the-art practice.
The Dirichlet process was introduced by Ferguson (1973) and since then it has played a vi-
tal role in Bayesian nonparametrics and its applications. As described by Ghosal (2010), a nice
motivation for the Dirichlet process is the inference problem of estimating a probability measure
on the real line. A Bayesian solution requires the specification of a random probability measure
as a prior and the detailed derivation of the posterior distribution. In a finite-dimensional set-
ting this can be achieved through the Dirichlet-multinomial conjugate model. Therefore, for the
infinite-dimensional case, the Dirichilet process works as a prior on the space of probability dis-
tributions and just as the Dirichlet distribution we will preserve a nice conjugacy property with
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the multinomial likelihood. If
{Xi}ni=1|P i.i.d∼ P
P ∼ DP(α),
where α is a finite measure on the space and P is defined and can be written as θP0 with θ
the total mass and P0 a probability measure, then the posterior distribution follows a Dirichlet
process with updated parameter:
P |X1, ..., Xn ∼ DP
(
α+
n∑
i=1
δXi
)
.
Using this last expression we obtain a nice expression for the predictive distribution
Xn+1|X1, ..., Xn ∼

δX∗j with probability proportional to nj
P0 with probability proportional to θ,
where X∗j is the set of distinct values observed in X1, ..., Xn and nj the number of times we have
observed them. So we will be observing either a previously seen value or a completely new one,
a characteristic which is really useful in clustering applications. The procedure just described
is commonly known as the Blackwell-Macqueen sampling scheme (Blackwell and MacQueen,
1973).
Exploiting the structure of the posterior and predictive distribution of the Dirichlet process,
Heard and Rubin-Delanchy (2016) developed a Bayesian nonparametric approach to intrusion
detection by assuming a Dirichlet process-based model for each message recipient on a set of
computers and the directed connections amongst them that represent the node set V and the
set of edges E respectively in a directed graph (V,E), which can be thought as a set of objects
connected together where the source node and destination node can be identified for each con-
nection (the direction matters). The first step of their anomaly detection procedure is to obtain
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the predictive p-value for the event xn+1 defined as
pn+1 =
∑
x∈V :θ∗x≤θ∗xn+1
θ∗x
θ∗
where θ∗x = θP0(x) +
∑n
i=1 δXi(x) and θ
∗ = θ + n. These p-values quantify the level of surprise
of a new connection. Since the goal is to detect anomalies in each source computer, the m p-
values observed in the edge (x, y) are reduced to a single score using Tippett’s method (Tippett,
1931), i.e., by using the lower tail of a Beta (1,m) distribution evaluated in the minimum of these
m p-values. Finally, a single score for each node x is obtained using Fisher’s method (Fisher,
1934), that is, by using the upper tail of a χ2 distribution with |Ex| degrees of freedom. These
final scores obtained for each source computer x, are ranked from the most interesting to least
interesting source nodes. This detection procedure is highly parallelisable and hence, suitable
for large networks.
Working along this line, Sanna Passino and Heard (2019) examined a joint model of a se-
quence of computer network links {(xi, yi)}ni=1, with xi and yi representing the source and des-
tination computer respectively, based on the Pitman-Yor process (PY). This stochastic process
was first introduced in Perman et al. (1992) and further results were developed in Pitman and
Yor (1997). The Pitman-Yor process, also known as the two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet process,
belongs to a special class of random probability measures known as Poisson-Kingman models
(Pitman, 2003). This stochastic process, as the name suggests, requires two parameters which
are usually denoted by σ ∈ [0, 1) (commonly known as the discount parameter) and θ > −σ
(the strength parameter). An appealing characteristic of this stochastic process is the predictive
distribution that can be obtained in a close form and given by:
Xn+1|X1, ..., Xn ∼

δX∗j with probability proportional to (nj − σ)
P0 with probability proportional to θ + kσ,
where k is the number of different observations and P0, nj and X∗j are defined just as for the DP.
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From the predictive distribution we can notice that if we let σ → 0 we recover the DP, thus, the
Pitman-Yor process can be thought as a generalisation of the DP. Another interesting remark that
can be directly observed from the predictive distribution is that the probability of a new value
depends on k, so the more unique observations we have, the more likely it will be to obtain
new samples from P0. This is certainly useful for applications where power-law behaviour is
observed, something the DP can not achieve. It can also be seen the role σ plays, the closer it is
to 1 it will make that the unique observations Xj ’s having small frequencies nj are unlikely to be
sampled.
In Sanna Passino and Heard (2019) the joint modelling of p(x, y) is achieved through the
decomposition p(x|y)p(y) by assuming the sequence of destination nodes, {yi}, to be exchange-
able with a hierarchical Pitman-Yor distribution and conditioned on the destination node the
sequence of source nodes connecting to that destination, {xi|y}, are also exchangeable with a
hierarchical Pitman-Yor distribution with parameters depending on y. The mathematical repre-
sentation of the model is:
x|y ∼ Fx|yi
yi ∼ G
Fx|y ∼ PY(αy, θy, F0)
G ∼ PY(α, θ,G0)
As for the detection procedure, it follows the same reasoning as in Heard and Rubin-Delanchy
(2016), that is, for each source computer one needs to obtain the predictive p-values and combine
them into a single score. Besides the use of the Pitman-Yor process rather than the Dirichlet
process, there are two other interesting results found in this approach. The first one is that the
authors do not restrict their attention to the use of p-values and they explore the use of mid p-
values (the reader can direct the attention to Lancaster (1952) and Rubin-Delanchy et al. (2019)
for an insight on mid p-values and why in some problems they might be preferred over p-values).
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Finally, they also explore the use of other p-value combiners such as Pearson’s method (Pearson,
1933) and Stouffer’s method (Stouffer, 1949). Results on the same data set yields better results
with the Pitman-Yor process and with use of mid p-values.
4 Malware detection and classification
The malware detection and classification problem is the third group of cyber threat investiga-
tion problems that we consider in this review. A malware is defined as a software specifically
designed to disrupt, damage or gain access to a computer system. Nowadays there are many
types of malware, such as spyware, adware, ransomware, amongst others, including several
variations of them. That is why the fast detection of unknown malware is one of the biggest con-
cerns of cyber security. However, accurate detection is not the only task required when dealing
with malicious software. Malware have to be classified into families for a better understand-
ing of how they infect computers, their threat level and therefore, how to be protected against
them. Correct classification of new malware into known families may also speed-up the process
of reverse-engineering to fix computer systems that were infected.
In order to have good explanatory and predictive models for the malware detection and
classification problem, researchers have mainly used the content of the malware in two ways,
either by using the hexadecimal representation of the binary code or the dynamic trace. In the
following subsections we describe both kinds of data sets and how they have been used for
malware detection.
4.1 Hexadecimal representation and n-grams
In computer science the byte is the basic unit of information for storage and processing and it is
most commonly represented by a sequence of 8 binary digits (bits). Every instruction given to a
computer (malicious or not) can be broken down into sequences of bytes, which form the instruc-
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tion’s binary code. These sequences can be expressed in a more compact way through the use of
the hexadecimal representation. In this representation each byte is written as a combination of
two elements of the set {0, 1, ..., 9, A,B, ..., F}.
For malware detection and classification the hexadecimal representation of the binary code
is used in conjunction to what is known in literature as n-grams. An n-gram is usually defined as
a contiguous sequence of n elements; these elements, depending on the field (e.g. linguistics or
probability), can be letters, numbers, words, etc. In computer science and for malware detection
and classification purposes, the elements are the hexadecimal representation of each byte. For
example, considering n = 4, for the code extract given by
00 00 1C 40 2A 28
we take all the possible sequences of 4 contiguous bytes to create the set of 4-grams, i.e.,
{00001C40, 001C402A, 1C402A28}. The elements of the set of all the different n-grams are as-
sumed to completely characterise benign and malicious code through their presence and ab-
sence. Hence, the set of n-grams needs to be modelled for the prediction of new observations,
contrary to the classical n-gram analysis where these structures are used as a probabilistic model
for the prediction of the next item in a sequence. In practice, it has been observed that the set
of unique n-grams is huge even for small data sets (easily reaching the order of millions), so it
becomes computationally unfeasible to use all this information and a feature selection procedure
is required as a first step.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no Bayesian approach to malware detection and clas-
sification using the hexadecimal representation of the binary code. However, we believe this line
of work should be appealing to the Bayesian community as well due to assumptions made and
the challenge it represents. First of all, the data can be represented by a N ×M binary matrix
where the rows are either malicious and benign code. From a Bayesian perspective one could be
interested in modelling this binary matrix using a conjugate beta-Bernoulli hierarchical model
26
or by choosing more complex models like a logistic regression for malware detection. It should
also be clear that this is a high-dimensional problem in both rows and columns, so Bayesian
nonparametric models could be definitely helpful for analysing this sort of data.
Moreover, the assumptions made can be easily generalised for the classification into known
families problem. For this matter, the Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge data set (Ro-
nen et al., 2018) provides an excellent starting point for the task. This data set contains almost
11,000 malware representing a mix of 9 known families of malicious threats. For each file the
hexadecimal representation of the binary code can be obtained and therefore, we could obtain
the n-grams that characterise each family. The feature selection can be chosen in such a way that
there is sharing of information and Bayesian hierarchical models developed for classification
purposes.
4.2 Dynamic traces as Markovian structures
The second approach to malware detection and classification is to use the dynamic traces of the
malware, which is basically the set of instructions executed by the malicious code in order to
infect the system. For example,
push push move call xor ...
Following the ideas of Storlie et al. (2014), many authors have assumed that these traces have
a Markovian structure and in that way the interest relies in modelling and analysing the transi-
tion probability matrix. Since there are hundreds of commonly used instructions and thousand
of them overall, modelling the one-to-one transition is not feasible. However, there are some
instructions that perform the same or similar task so creating groups of similar instructions is
a reasonable first step. Storlie et al. (2014) developed four different categorisations of these in-
structions with 8, 56, 86 and 122 groups respectively. For malware detection and classification
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approaches the most widely used categorisation is the one with 8 classes, which include amongst
others: math, memory, stack, other.
The mathematical framework is fully specified by letting c to be the number of instruction
categories previously chosen (e.g., 8), then a dynamic trace is defined as a sequence {x1, ..., xn}
with xi ∈ {1, ..., c} that are modelled as a Markov chain. Hence, we let Zi be the transition counts
matrix for the i-th program, Pi to be the probability transition matrix and Bi an indicator if the
program is malicious or not. Storlie et al. (2014) proposed that the elements of the estimated Pi
should be used as predictors to classify a program as malicious or not through a logistic spline
regression model. The actual predictors to model Bi are
yi = (logit(Pˆi,1,1), logit(Pˆi,1,2), ..., logit(Pˆi,c,c−1), logit(Pˆi,c,c))′.
Finally, a symmetric prior Dirichlet distribution with parameter ν is used as a prior for each row
of Pi, where Pˆi denotes the posterior mean.
Working directly on this approach, Kao et al. (2015) proposed a flexible Bayesian
nonparametric approach for modelling the probability transition matrices using a mixture of
Dirichlet processes (MDP) (Antoniak, 1974) as prior for the transition probability matrix in order
to capture variability across programs. Choosing the MDP as prior rather than the Dirichlet pro-
cess is due to the fact that the Dirichlet process has almost surely discrete realisations; therefore,
having ties would be something unrealistic for some applications (including the modelling of
probability transition matrices).
Thus, Kao et al. (2015) specify the following model for the probability transition matrices:
Pi|Qi, σ i.i.d.∼ MD(σQi)
Qi|G i.i.d.∼ G
G ∼ DP (θ, P0),
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where P0 follows a matrix Dirichlet (MD) distribution centered in some constant matrix Pˆ , σ > 0
controls the variance of Pi and the matrix Qi is the shape parameter. This MD distribution
implies that each row of Pi independently follows a c-dimensional Dirichlet distribution with
concentration parameter equal to the corresponding row of σQi. The model is completely spec-
ified by letting Bi be the indicator random variable of maliciousness just like before. A new
program i∗ is classified as malicious if P(Bi∗ = 1|Zi∗ ,Z ) exceeds a predefined threshold, with
Z being the collection of all observed counts matrices. Moreover, if the program is malicious it
can be further classified into a cluster with existing programs that share common features using
an MCMC procedure.
A different approach for the modelling of dynamic traces was developed by Bolton and
Heard (2018). Their approach followed the same assumptions, i.e., that dynamic traces, speci-
fied by the prior clustering of common instructions, have a Markovian structure so that they can
be well-modelled by a Markov chain model. However, they further assumed that the Markov
structure changes over time with recurrent regimes of transition patterns. Therefore, each dy-
namic trace will be modelled as a Markov chain with a time varying transition probability matrix
P(t).
In order to detect the regime changes three change-point models are described. The basic
idea is that there are k ≥ 0 change-points that partition the dynamic trace and where within
each segment the trace follows a homogeneous Markov chain. The methods vary in the way
the probability transition matrices are defined within each segment. The first method changes
the whole matrix in each segment, the second one only allows some of the rows to change and
finally the regime switching method allows the change in rows not only to be forward but also
to go back to a vector of probabilities that governed the Markov chain in earlier segments. A
reversible jump MCMC (Green, 1995) is further used for the sampling of these change-points.
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Finally, the authors proposed a classification procedure based on a similarity measure of the
vectors of change-points and their regimes that obtains the minimum value for the two samples
of the proportions of instructions which occur within regimes shared by both traces. A high
level of similarity requires that a large number of observations in both dynamic traces need to
be drawn from common regimes
5 Alternative cyber threat anomaly detection approaches
It is imperative to stress that the models and the kind of data described in the previous sections
are far from being exhaustive. They represent the ones that we have found to be the most fre-
quently used for the general class of cyber threat anomaly detection problems presented here.
However, there are other kind of cyber security related problems that have been tackled from a
Bayesian perspective and that could be appealing for future research purposes.
For example, Turcotte et al. (2016b) used computer event logs to identify misuse of cre-
dentials within a computer network. In their approach these logs are treated as an aggregated
multivariate data stream comprised of the client computer x, the server computer y and the
type of event e. These features are modelled independently for each user credential and the
probability of an observed triplet (xt, yt, et) at time t is modelled using the conditional probabil-
ities, that is, P(xt, yt, et) = P(xt)P(yt|xt)P(et|xt, yt). For each of these components an appropriate
multinomial-Dirichlet based model is used. In order to address the anomaly detection proce-
dure the predictive distributions are used to obtain the p-value that can be compared against a
predefined threshold. A second example for detecting compromised credentials can be found in
Price-Williams et al. (2018), where the authors proposed an alternative approach to users’ activity
anomaly detection by analysing the amount of user activity on a given day and the times where
these activities were realised. A seasonal behaviour model is developed by first constructing a
model to measure the user’s activity in a certain seasonal period and then using the events regis-
tered, a change-point density estimation model is used to estimate the times at which the events
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occurred. In this framework, users working at hours that differ from their normal schedule are
considered to be anomalous activities.
Other interesting approaches are aimed to obtain a better understanding of a computer net-
work’s behaviour. An example of this can be found in Price-Williams et al. (2017), where the
authors main goal is to detect automated events that can be viewed as polling behaviour from
an opening event originated by a user. It is discussed that achieving this should yield an im-
provement in the statistical model used and enhance its anomaly detection capabilities. In this
approach a change point model is used in each edge of the computer network in order to sepa-
rate human behaviour from automated events. This methodology works as an alternative to the
one presented in Heard et al. (2014), where the discrete Fourier transform is used.
Being able to detect automated events from human activity is not the only approach under-
taken for a better understanding of a computer network. Nowadays, there are computer net-
works that contain a vast number of nodes and thereby, a large number of connections amongst
them. In practice, temporal independence for the nodes is usually assumed to have mathematical
tractability; however, this is a strong assumption and a deeper understanding of the dependance
amongst these nodes is required. A recent approach by Price-Williams et al. (2019) aims to detect
and understand the interactions between computer nodes in order to detect correlated traffic
patterns to reduce false positives when performing anomaly detection. A test based on higher
criticism (Donoho and Jin, 2004) is used to detect this dependence.
6 Final remarks
Cyber security research from a mathematical and statistical point of view is challenging due to
the inherent complexity of the problems and the nature of the data sets used. We believe that
in order to be well-prepared against the current cyber threats, Bayesian statistics offers a wide
range of flexible models that might be the key for a deeper understanding of the generative pro-
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cess at the basis of malicious attacks and, at the same time, for us to have predictive models able
to handle large volumes of time-evolving data. That is why in this review paper we have pre-
sented the statistical approach to cyber security anomaly detection methods, making particular
emphasis on Bayesian models.
As remarked in Section 5, the methodologies described in this review are far from being
exhaustive. In a highly connected world with cyber threats being more dangerous than ever
there is a need for a thorough understanding on the computer networks’ behaviour. That is why
as the interest in cyber security keeps increasing we are able to find (in a frequent basis) new
models that work directly along the line of some of the ones we have presented here, Moreover,
alternative approaches to the ones described in this review have been considered and proven
useful for both network modelling and anomaly detection.
We would also like to point out that, although there has been an actual increase in cyber
security research from a Bayesian point of view, to the best of our knowledge, there are some
areas that have not been as widely explored as others. Most of the work we have encountered
corresponds to either volume-traffic or network anomaly detection. Malware related problems,
like detection and classification, are still open areas of research that need to be deeply developed.
As a final comment, we would like the reader to note that, although it was not mentioned
directly in each of the sections of the review paper, anomaly detection models for cyber security
research require the analysis of high-volumes of data. No matter if it is for volume-traffic anal-
ysis, network modelling or malware detection and classification, all of them require handling
and learning from data sets that are usually very large. This definitely plays a vital role in cyber
security research, since we have always to keep in mind that whilst developing statistical models
for this kind of problems, there is a need for algorithms able to scale well, to be parallelised and,
in preference, able to perform in a sequential procedure as new data is observed.
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Notes
1 The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was a packet switching net-
work developed in the late 1960s that is widely considered to be the predecessor of the Internet
(Oppliger, 2001).
2 de Finetti’s representation theorem is due to Hewitt and Savage (1955) who generalised de
Finetti’s theorem for exchangeable 0-1 random variables (de Finetti, 1930).
3 tcpdump is a computer software that allows the user to obtain the transmitted or received
packets over a computer network.
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